Abstract. The processing of data is often restricted by contractual and legal requirements for protecting privacy and IPRs. Policies provide means to control how and by whom data is processed. Conditions of policies may depend on the previous processing of the data. However, existing policy languages do not provide means to express such conditions. In this work we present a formal model and language allowing for specifying conditions based on the processing history. We base the model and language on XACML.
Introduction
Contracts (e.g. service level agreements) and laws (e.g. privacy laws) entitle customers to control the processing of their data. Policies are statements of the goals for the behavior of a system [7] and thus provides means to control the processing of data. However, conditions of policies frequently depend on environmental (or contextual) information. Such policies demand for controlling the process not only with respect to the actual processing step (including actors, processed data, etc.) but also with respect to the history of the processing (e.g. the number of backups that have been made, or who has encrypted the data). In this paper, we focus on policies in business processes containing conditions based on the processing history; as is common in communities dealing with such processing histories, we call the information about processing histories provenance information.
To accomplish this task, we need to tackle several principal problems. First, in closed environments the environmental information can be collected with various existing logging mechanisms and be accessed by means of various, often proprietary, solutions. However, as soon as processes span multiple organizations and data is transfered across organizational boundaries, the provenance information must be provided in a standardized manner. The open provenance model (OPM) [10] constitutes such an approach.
Second, the policy conditions must be able to relate to provenance information. Some policy languages allow for building policies containing conditions based on provenance information (e.g. XACML [1] or Rei [8] ). However, existing policy mechanisms lack a specification of how to specify or access provenance information. Based on the open provenance model, we introduce a formal language that specifies the relation between policy condition and provenance information. We specify the language by means of an abstract syntax extending the syntactic structure of eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) and we provide a corresponding description of its execution semantics. We call our approach PAPEL: Provenance-Aware Policy definition and Execution Language. To show its feasibility, we implement PAPEL using Datalog.
Third, the provenance information may not be queriable, because the information may not be accessible (e.g. due to log encryption [11] ). To be still able to validate compliance with the given policies, the required provenance information must stay accessible. We achieve this by introducing attributes and reduced facts in PAPEL. Both mechanisms ensure that only a minimum of confidential information is disclosed to third parties.
In this paper, we tackle these problems as follows: First, we introduce a case study, point out problematic issues and derive requirements in Section 2. Then, we discuss the foundations of PAPEL in Section 3, introduce the syntax of PAPEL in Section 4, and define the semantics in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss the Datalog implementation of our abstract syntax. Finally, we analyze related work and its capabilities to solve the previously introduced problems in Section 7.
Case Study and Requirements
In this section, we present a case study depicting issues that occur with policies in distributed environments:
Sharing of Health Records: A research institute of the University of Koblenz (ukob) requires data about actual patients for its research. To this end, it cooperates with the hospital Koblenz Medical Center (kmc). The kmc shares its patients' health records with the research institute that can access the records on a server of the hospital. The patients may choose if their data can be used for research or not. The patients' permissions are required before the hospital is allowed to share the data. If patients permit the use, they may additionally demand that their data is only used after their names have been exchanged by pseudonyms.
Jane Doe a patient of the kmc has specified a list of policies regarding her health record (record JD) and the forwarding of the record to the research laboratory of ukob:
-(A) Jane Doe allows kmc to share her record for research purposes with ukob.
-(B) However, she demands that her record is de-identified before it is shared.
-(C) With the de-identified record the research laboratory is allowed to do anything, beside transferring it to another organization.
In addition to the patient's policies, the kmc has own policies for forwarding health records:
The kmc demands that the sharing of health records is approved and the approval confirmed before the record is accessed by ukob.
In the case study multiple issues arise. We introduce a selection of these issues in the following list, before we describe what is required to solve the issues.
-(1) ukob will access health records. To this end, the institute needs to know which actions are permitted or restricted.
The provenance information of a patient may contain personal information. Thus, the kmc wants to encrypt the provenance information before forwarding a record. At the same time the kmc has to ensure that the information needed to interpret the policies is still available without decryption.
Requirements
In summary we can point out the following technical and organizational requirements:
-Requirement 'Availability': The policies must be available to anybody accessing the associated data (see issue (1)). -Requirement 'Expressiveness': The used policy language must be able to express permissions and restrictions (see issue (1); cf. XACML [1] ). -Requirement 'Accessibility': The information required by policy conditions must be accessible even if confidential parts of the data and of the provenance information stay hidden (see issue (2) ). -Requirement 'Updating': Rules are required that specify which additional information about the processing must be provided and when it must be updated (see issue (2) ).
In addition to access policies such as specified in languages like XACML, we need provenance information to address these issues and thus to meet the requirements. In the following sections we present a solution consisting of three parts: first, the foundations we build on; second, an abstract syntax of our novel policy language PAPEL; and third, the semantics of this language.
Foundations of PAPEL
In this section we describe the foundations PAPEL is based on. As discussed above, we require to model provenance information and policies. To this end, we make use of the Open Provenance Model and of the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language. To integrate both models we introduce an abstract syntax extending the abstract syntax of XACML.
Open Provenance Model
The Open Provenance Model (OPM) [10] defines a process as an action or series of actions performed on or caused by artifacts, and resulting in new artifacts. We transform the information which is given by a graph structure in the OPM as sets of primitives. The transformation leads to provenance information represented by our abstract syntax, which is specified in Table 1 . We use the step primitive:
step (Data, Actors, InvolvedAgents, Category, Purpose, ID, PIDs) to express the following constituents of OPM:
-Data is the artifact processed during the execution of the processing step. In OPM an artifact is defined as an immutable piece of state, which may have [..] a digital representation in a computer system. -Actors are the agents controlling the process, In OPM an agent is defined as a contextual entity acting as a catalyst of a process, enabling, facilitating, controlling, affecting its execution. -InvolvedAgents are agents involved in a process that do not trigger the processing (e.g. the receiver of a transfer or access rights). -ID is the unique identifier of the processing step (as defined by OPM 1 ). -PIDs are the unique identifiers of the directly preceding processing steps.
The ID together with the PIDs creates a partial order of processing steps. Beside these constituents of OPM, the step primitive also specifies the following properties of a processing step:
-Category is the category of the processing step. The possible categories are defined in a domain specific ontology. -Purpose is the purpose of executing the processing step. The purpose of a processing step is defined in domain specific ontologies.
Example 1: In the following we depict the provenance information of a processing step of the Koblenz Medical Center (kmc): In the depicted processing step the health record of Jane Doe is shared 2 for research purposes with the University of Koblenz (ukob): step (record_JD, {kmc}, {ukob}, share, research, 3, {2}) 1 In the examples we make use of simple integers, to increase readability. 2 In this and the following examples we assume that used concepts are defined in a domain ontology provided by kmc
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
We use The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [1] as a starting point for our formal model. XACML is a standard defining a XML based policy framework. XACML supports three policy elements, i.e. permission (permit), restriction (deny) and obligation, that we need to fulfill the Requirement 'Expressiveness'. To generalize from XACML and to integrate with the provenance information, we introduce an abstract syntax for permission, restrictions and obligations based on XACML in Section 4 below. XACML policies define rules by connecting a set of subjects (actors) with a set of targets (data) and by specifying the conditions of the rule. If the conditions are fulfilled, XACML rules result in a given effect, which is permit or deny. In addition, a rule may require that certain obligations are met before a permission is granted. However, this kind of obligations is expressed as part of conditions in PAPEL (see Example 3) exploiting the provenance information.
Syntax of PAPEL
To evaluate rules, the provenance information can be used as source of information about the previous processing. PAPEL defines an abstract syntax (see Table 1 ) to express provenance information and polices rules based on provenance information.
The provenance information is provided by means of logging or monitoring mechanisms (cf. [11, 12] ). In PAPEL, we use primitives to define provenance information (primitive is the start symbol of the provenance part of the PA-PEL syntax). We use the step primitive as introduced in Section 3 (see Example 1) and the reduced primitive to specify the processing provenance and the attribute primitive to specify attributes and their value (see Table 1 ). The processing steps, attribute assignments and reduced facts collected during the execution of a process build the processing history, which we define as follows:
We define a history H as a conjunction of positive facts specifying processing steps, attribute assignments and reduced facts.
Policy rules are provided by the person concerned or IPR owner. In PA-PEL, we use rules to specify policies (rule is the start symbol of the policy part of the PAPEL syntax). We distinguish three types of rules: permit, deny and assignment rules. All three types may depend on a condition and have the parameter ID, which refers to the actual processing step. Assignment rules specify the change of an attribute value by use of the set_attribute primitive.
Permissions and Restrictions
We model permissions as rules specifying which kinds of processing steps are permitted. Likewise, restrictions are modeled as rules specifying which processing PAPEL Syntax for Provenance Information: Syntax Element EBNF syntax
Primitive
Step | ReducedFact | Attribute ; Step "step ("Data", "Actors", "InvolvedAgents", "Category", "Purpose", "ID", "PIDs")." ; ReducedFact "reduced ("Data", "(Actors | "hidden")", "(InvolvedAgents | "hidden")", "(Category | "hidden")", "(Purpose | "hidden")", "ID", "PIDs")." ; Attribute "attribute ("Name", "Value", "ID")." ; PAPEL Syntax for Policies: Syntax Element EBNF syntax
Step | ReducedFact ")") ; SetAttribute "set_attribute ("Name", "Value", "ID")." ; SetReducedFact "set_reduced ("Data", "(Actors | "hidden")", "(InvolvedAgents | "hidden")", "(Category | "hidden")", "(Purpose | "hidden")", "ID", "PIDs")." ; BooleanOperator "AND" | "OR" | "XOR" ; Table 1 . Syntax of PAPEL.
steps are prohibited. The rules consist of two parts: the name, which indicates the type of the policy (permit or deny), and the body of the rule, which defines the conditions and obligatory processing steps. Conditions are used to express dependencies between policies and environmental information and are specified after the IF statement (see Table 1 ).
Example 2: This example formalizes policy (A): All entities are denied to transfer the data record 1, beside kmc that is allowed for transferring the data for research purposes to ukob:
IF step (record_JS, _, _, transfer, _, ID, _) AND NOT permit (ID).
The second rule of this example denies the transfer of record JS. By means of the additional part of the condition AND NOT permit (ID) we can define ex-ceptions to this rule. In the example the exception is defined by the first rule and allows kmc to transfer the record to ukob.
Example 3:
The following example depicts the implementation of policy (B) of the running example (see Section 2). The patient demands that her record 1 is de-identified before it is transfered: permit (ID) IF step (record_JS, _, _, transfer, _, ID, {PID}) AND step (record_JS, _, _, update, de-identify, PID, _).
By using variables (in the example PID), we can specify that the approval step has to be performed directly before the processing step, which should be permitted. If the variable is not used, any preceding approval step will fulfill the condition.
Example 4:
In this example we express the policy (C) from our running example: All processing steps that are not transfer actions will be permitted if they are performed by ukob: permit (ID) IF (step (_, {ukob}, _, Category, _, ID, _) AND NOT (Category = transfer)).
In the example above we make use of the logical constant ukob, which is defined in a domain ontology. In addition, we use the variable Category and unnamed variables indicated by _. The _ represents another unnamed variable each time it is used. An unnamed variable matches all possible values of its type (cf. existential quantification).
Condition Statements
In PAPEL, condition statements can be composed using logical operators (NOT, AND, OR, XOR and AFTER) How these operators can be combined is specified in Table 1 . In addition, Table 1 depicts, that parentheses are used to specify the interpretation order of complex statements. We define the semantics of the operators in Table 2 . In difference to Example 3the rule in this example uses AFTER. By means of the AFTER construct we can access the partial order of the processing steps in the history. The variable R assures that the approval and confirmation is given for the health record that should be accessed.
Attributes and Reduced Facts
As stated above the provenance information can be used as source of information about the previous processing. However, the provenance information may contain sensitive data (e.g. the provenance information that the cancer medication has been adjusted). Thus, some logging approaches provide security mechanisms like the encryption of the provenance information (e.g. [11] ). To maintain the ability to check the compliance with a policy, a method is needed to enable access to relevant information or provide the information directly (Requirement 'Accessibility'). To this end, we introduce attributes as well as reduced facts.
Attributes can be used to specify provenance information that can be expressed by a value (e.g. de-identification status, modification counter, etc.). We specify attributes by the attribute primitive (see Table 1 ). The attribute primitive has three parameters, the Name of the attribute, its assigned Value, and the identifier ID of the processing step, when the assignment was performed. The value of the attribute is assigned by the actor performing the processing step. The assignment is done according to the assignment rule defined by the creator of the policies. If the executed processing step replaces all names in record 1 with pseudonyms, set the attribute named deidentified to true, and if the record is re-identified, set the attribute to false:
assignment(ID) IF step (record_JS, _, _, _, de-identified, ID, _) DO set_attribute (de-identified, true, ID). assignment(ID) IF step (record_JS, _, _, _, re-identified, ID, _) DO set_attribute (de-identified, false, ID).
A reduced fact is a description of a processing step that is reduced to the necessary and contains only the required information. Which information is hidden is specified by means of assignments that are defined by the creator of the policy. Reduced facts are used if attributes are not expressive enough (e.g. has the last de-identification been performed by a specific actor). A reduced fact is added to the provenance information. In difference to the full description, the information of the reduced fact must not be encrypted to allow for querying the information. The adding of the reduced fact is achieved by the actor performing the processing step following assignments defined by the policy creator.
The parameters Data, Actors, InvolvedAgents, Category, and Purpose are replaced by the empty placeholders hidden as required. The parameters ID and PIDs must not be replaced. These two parameters are required to reproduce the (partial) order of processing steps.
Example 7:
In the following we depict the provenance information of a processing step of the department for nuclear medicine: The processing step updates the health record by adding a new cancer medication:
If this information is not relevant to the analysis of ukob, the kmc will encrypt the original information about the processing step and will provide reduced provenance information:
reduced (record_JS, hidden, hidden, update, hidden, 3, {2})
Execution Semantics of PAPEL
In this section we define the semantics of PAPEL. The semantics of PAPEL specifies if execution steps of a given history violate a given set of policy rules. To this end, we define a Tarskian semantics mapping syntactic elements of PAPEL onto subsets and relations over a universe U . Based on this semantics we define when a set of policies is fulfilled with respect to a history H (see Definition 1). First we define minimal models of a history H:
We define a minimal model M of the history H as a model to which no strictly smaller Herbrand model of the history H exist [9] .
A minimal model of a history is only a model of the history and of subparts of the history. Based on the definition of a minimal model of a history we define when a set of policies is fulfilled:
Definition 3: We define that a set of policy rules R is fulfilled with respect to a history H if each minimal model M of the history H is also a model of the set of policy rules R.
The Universe and Basic Axioms
The universe U is the set: U = ∆ ∪ A ∪ X ∪ Ψ ∪ Φ ∪ N ∪ V , where ∆ is the set of artifacts (e.g. data), A is the set of agents (including actors), X is the set of categories, Ψ is the set of purposes, Φ is the set of processing step identifiers, N is the set of attribute identifiers, and V the set of attribute values. These subsets of U are mutually disjoint.
For the following definitions be I a partial interpretation function and be P (S) the power set of S. We define I to map atomic elements of PAPEL onto the (parts of) our universe U as follows:
I ∈ Φ, ρ I ⊆ Φ, µ I ∈ N , and ν I ∈ V . The predicate representing the processing steps step is interpreted as:
and the predicate representing the attribute assignments attribute is interpreted as:
Thereby, the partial interpretation function I must satisfy the following constraints: Each identifier id I must clearly identify one processing step:
Analogously, at each processing step specified by id I each attribute has exactly one value at a time:
The processing history is defined as partial order > ⊆ Φ × Φ of processing steps, reduced facts, and attribute assignments. A tuple (id I , pid I ) is element of >, if and only if the processing step specified by pid precedes the processing step specified by id. Before we define >, we define the relation ⊆ Φ × Φ of directly preceding processing steps, reduced facts, and attribute assignments. A processing step s dpid immediately precedes a processing step s id , if s id is the successor of s dpid :
A processing step precedes another processing step, if a trace of consecutive processing steps exists that connects both steps:
In the following, we extend the interpretation function I by the interpretation of non-atomic syntactic expressions of PAPEL.
Processing Steps, Reduced Facts and Attributes
The result of the interpretation of the set attribute predicate will be true if the value of the attribute is updated in all directly succeeding processing steps.
Logical expressions
Above we introduced the following syntactical elements NOT, AND, OR, and XOR. Their semantics are defined in the same manner as the corresponding boolean expressions (see Table 2 ). For example the not ⊆ {true, f alse} relations is defined as:
(not(e)) I = true if e I = f alse, false else.
In addition, we introduce the syntactical element AFTER, which is defined as the following relation: af ter
, where: 
Permission, restriction and assignment
Be L the set of functions implementing logical expressions. Permissions, restrictions, and assignments are functions permit I : Φ → {true, f alse}, deny I : Φ → {true, f alse}, and assignment I : Φ → {true, f alse} as follows:
permit : Φ → {true, f alse} is a function that will return true if the processing step identified by ID is permitted. If it is not permitted, it will return f alse. Be p 1 , p 2 , .., p n ∈ L the functions implementing the conditions of all rules defining permissions. The predicate permit is interpreted as follows:
deny : Φ → {true, f alse} is a function that will return true if the processing step identified by ID is not denied. If it is denied, it will return f alse. Be d 1 , d 2 , .., d m ∈ L the functions implementing the conditions of all rules defining restrictions and be s = (δ, α, β, χ, ψ, id, ρ), deny is interpreted as follows::
assignment : Φ → {true, f alse} is a function that will return true if the processing step identified by ID does not violate an assignment. If it violates an assignment, it will return f alse. Be c 1 , c 2 , .., c k ∈ L the functions implementing the conditions of all rules defining assignments and be a 1 , a 2 , .., a k the set attribute and set reduced predicates of all rules defining assignments, assignment is interpreted as follows:
Fulfilling Policies
Policies will be fulfilled with respect to a history if each minimal model of a history is also a model of the policies (see Definition 3) . This definition in combination with the PAPEL semantics have the following conclusion: A processing history will fulfill a set of policy rules, if all processing steps in the history are permitted with respect to the permissions (permit I ) and not prohibited with respect to the restrictions (deny I ) and if no assignment (assignment I ) has been violated.
Datalog Implementation of PAPEL
Implementing PAPEL, we have demonstrated its feasibility. In the implementation the provenance information is provided as database. To access the provenance information we make use of the database query language Datalog. We have chosen Datalog to provide a general implementation with a formal grounding. In our implementation, we use facts to specify the provenance information and rules to query it.
To validate a set of policies the following preparation steps are required: (1) All Datalog rules required to specify syntactical elements are added to the database; (2) A Datalog fact is generated for each processing step, which is described by the provenance information. The facts are added to the database; (3) The Datalog rules specifying the policies are added to the database; (4) A Datalog fact specifying the processing step that should be performed is added to the database; and (5) For each attribute Datalog facts for each processing step are generated and added to the database.
Then, the database is queried by means of a rule, which specifies the query if the processing step identified by the given ID will be allowed or not.
Related Work
Many policy languages exist that are applicable for our purpose. Thus, we based PAPEL on these existing languages. Starting with the expressiveness of PAPEL, we decided to use the main policy elements 'restriction' (deny) and 'permission' (permit), as defined in the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [1] . Polices, which are based on complex environmental knowledge such as provenance information, can not be specified using XACML. With our policy language we extend the expressiveness of XACML conditions to cover provenance information. In addition, PAPEL provides a formal model for policies.
As a foundation for more complex policy conditions we used the work of Kagal et al. [8] . They present a domain-centric and entity-centric policy language named Rei. Rei provides a mechanism for modeling of speech acts and delegation of policies. The conditions in Rei are specified by means of Prolog. However, Rei does not define how to model conditions based on provenance information. We extend the work of Rei by defining a formalism for conditions based on provenance information and by providing a model-theoretical semantics.
Other work which is related to our work is the Web Services Policy 1.5 -Framework (WS-Policy) [2] that provides a model and syntax to specify the policies about entities in a Web services-based system. As WS-Policy is used to specify the policies about entities, like Web services, and not of the processed data, it is out of the focus of the WS-Policy framework to model conditions based on provenance information.
In Table 3 , we give an overview of further related work in the field of policy languages. The Table compares the following properties of of policy languages: Are policies directly linked to a piece of data? Does the policy language allow for expressing dataflow polices and/or access control policies? Do policy conditions allow for relating to provenance information (processing traces)? Does the policy language allow for protecting confidential provenance information. Finally, we compare if the language has a syntax definition, a formal semantics and an implementation.
However, all of them provide additional aspects of policy languages that are not in our focus. Some policy approaches provide methods to enforce policy compliance in closed environments, like organizations (cf. [4] ) or data silos (cf. [6] Rei [8] XrML [13] Casandra [5] e-Wallet [6] IFAudit [3] Linked languages consider credentials to gain access rights (cf. [13, 5] ), support roles and role delegation (cf. [5] ), or provide algorithms to identify violated policies (cf. [3] ).
Conclusion and Future Work
Existing policy languages provide means to control how and by whom data is processed. The conditions of policies may depend on the previous processing of the data. Such policies demand for controlling the process with respect to the history of the processing. However, existing policy languages do not specify how to access the provenance information about the previous processing. In this work we have introduced PAPEL a provenance-aware policy definition and execution language motivated by XACML. PAPEL allows for policy conditions to relate to provenance information.
We have presented the abstract syntax of PAPEL, which extends the syntactic structures of XACML and OPM. In addition, we have provided a corresponding description of its execution semantics and we have sketched an implementation of PAPEL using Datalog.
In addition we have discussed how data protection can hamper the interpretation of policy conditions. We have presented means to validate compliance with given policies even if the required provenance information is confidential. At the same time the confidential methods of PAPEL ensure that only a minimum of confidential information is disclosed to third parties. pean projects Where eGovernment meets the eSociety (WeGov, FP7-248512) and Knowledge Sharing and Reuse across Media (X-Media, FP6-26978) funded by the Information Society Technologies (IST) 6th and 7th Framework Programme.
